
Michael D. Doubler's book Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636-2000 provides the reader with a comprehensive history of the National Guard from its earliest inception. While the book gives the reader deep insight into the origins, roles, and development of the National Guard, it does not make for light reading. However, Doubler's book and its extensive list of sources will prove an excellent resource for anyone conducting in-depth research concerning the Army National Guard or American History, as both are inextricably intertwined. I recommend this book to personnel who are going to or currently in an assignment where they work with the National Guard, as the book broadens the reader's perspective on the duality of our Active and National Guard forces and how the historical catalysts of our Nation's history developed this relationship.

The very foundations of American military tradition lie in the deeply rooted militia tradition that early European colonists brought with them to the New World. A tradition which can be traced to ancient Greece, where the survival of Hellenic culture and society hinged on the service, training, and employment of citizen soldiers who could rapidly turn their hand from the toil of daily work necessary to preserve their society to face down threats that sought to destroy it.

While many often believe that the earliest militias in the New World were those of the English, there were even earlier militia organizations, which were established by the French and the Spanish, before the arrival of English colonists in the early 1600s. Just as the Greek city-states, and many other Western institutions and nations, had relied on militia forces for continued existence, so did the early European colonies rely heavily on the militia to guarantee their safety in a hostile New World. In these foreign surroundings, the very environment provided a significant challenge whose only solution was hard labor, not to mention the difficulties presented by marauding Indians and competing colonizing powers, which necessitated the employment of citizen soldiers.

The book is full of interesting, and little known, facts, for instance the origins of the term "National Guard." During the Civil War, as southern militia units were being overthrown, leading federal military institutions in the south, northern militia units were being called on to augment hard-pressed regular Union forces. For the Union leadership, one of the top priorities was to secure the Capital against attack by Confederate forces. In the opening days of the conflict, militia units were rushed to Washington to perform this function to free up regular forces for operations elsewhere. In this capacity, Militiamen of the 7th New York Infantry became the first militia units to begin to refer to themselves as "National Guard" and marked their equipment as such with the insignia "NG."

The modern National Guard really came into being at the dawn of the 20th century due to greater involvement by the United States in world affairs. As the foreign policy of the United States began to expand outside of its borders, there was an increased requirement to use military forces as an instrument of foreign policy. This necessity resulted in laws and policies that made the National Guard more standardized and in-line with Regular Army forces.

Due to the unrest in Europe and the challenges of a new technological war, combined with the German policy of unrestricted U-Boat warfare, the United States entered the European conflict. This tremendous undertaking required the transformation of our National Guard into organizations that could operate better with Regular Army forces. This integration was achieved during the conflict in Europe, however with the cessation of hostilities, the focus on the National Guard diminished and there was no centralized plan for rebuilding units upon redeployment to the United States.

The National Guard's involvement in National Military Strategy rose to the forefront again in the late 1930s due to events that were unfolding in Germany and Asia. At the beginning of World War II, the U.S. Army was only the 17th largest army in the world and initially was not technologically on-line with the powers involved in the conflict. Just as in WWII, guard divisions filled the gap, augmenting the standing regular Army until the draft system could provide the necessary soldiers for victory.

With victory achieved in Europe and Asia, a new conflict of ideologies arose between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. Due to the looming communist threat in Europe, the role of the National Guard in American military policy as a means of checking Soviet aggression was assured. Lessons were learned from de-mobilizing the Guard following WWII, and after WWII measures were employed for the National Guard to initially establish major commands, followed by their subordinate commands, to create viable units that could be rapidly mobilized, trained, and deployed to Western Europe.

The Korean War was the first real Cold War test for using the Army National Guard. The Guard was significant not only in its involvement in the Korean theater of operations, but also in the role of freeing-up active forces in Germany for use in Korea. Combat operations in Korea, coupled with the threat of a Soviet attack in Europe, resulted in fielding much heavier units within the National Guard to meet the growing communist threat. Another development that resulted was the implementation of a standardized basic training system that freed the Guard from not having to focus as heavily on training individual skills, thus enabling them to focus more on unit-level training, reducing the post-mobilization training time for National Guard units.

As the Cold War began to evolve in the early 1950s, Soviet nuclear developments changed the nature of the threat that existed in Europe. Now there was a viable threat to the Continental United States. The integration of the National Guard in an extensive air defense network to protect the United States from a Soviet long-range bomber threat. In the true spirit of the 18th-century minuteman, National Guard units in a state status were now charged with the full-time mission of protecting critical sites in the United States against Soviet nuclear aggression.

Initially, National Guard units manned the conventional air defense guns and artillery of the day. But this all changed with the advent of anti-aircraft missile technology and produced an air defense program that, at its peak in 1962, saw 46 of the 112 Nike-Hercules sites defending the Continental United States manned by National Guardsmen. By the early 1970s, the air defense missile technology was rendered obsolete due to developments by both sides in intercontinental ballistic missiles and the resulting policy of mutually assured destruction. However, the National Guard's involvement in providing CONUS air defense firmly established the Guard's role by demonstrating their ability to master technological developments in warfare to complement the Active Army.

Not only does Doubler's book deal with the role of the National Guard in our country's wars and the nation building of America, but also discusses integration of the Army, Reserve, and National Guard, the Civil Rights Movement, and incorporating women into the military. It also deals with the role of the National Guard both in Vietnam and here at home, along with the "total force policy" that began in the early 1970s and placed heavy reliance on the combat readiness of the National Guard. This policy contributed significantly to ending the Cold War and helped set the stage for victory during the Persian Gulf conflict in the early 1990s.

While the preface of Doubler's book touches on the Army National Guard and its role in a post-September 11 world, the actual book ends with the National Guard in transition as it develops its role in the new world order of a post-Cold War world on the doorstep of the 21st century. The book is an extensive historical record, and a tremendous academic undertaking. As such, it should be treated as a living document, expanded, updated, and subsequently published to document the tremendous accomplishments of National Guardsmen and National Guard units in diverse operations currently taking place both at home and abroad.

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If there is one attitude more dangerous than to assume that a future war will be just like the last one, it is to imagine that it will be so utterly different that we can ignore all the lessons of the last one.

— Sir John Slessor, RAF

One of the oldest criticisms of military command—ers is they are constantly trying to fight the last war. Bruce Berkowitz’s The New Face of War puts a new spin on this axiom by showing military thinkers of all services that there really is nothing new under the sun. Berkowitz shows reader that the future of 21st-century warfare can be found in informational transformations of the past.

Berkowitz’s intent is to give military and civilian leaders a better understanding of the new face of war and how the United States will be impacted especially with regard to the information revolution, which has always been a part of combat. The New Face of War asserts that information, not technology, has always provided the edge to any successful military operation. Berkow-tiz uses history to show that the commander who can use relevant information to get inside an opponent’s decision cycle will triumph in combat. If this concept sounds like Air Force Colonel John R. Boyd’s observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop, it should. Berkowitz cites Boyd’s theory numerous times throughout the book.

What is insightful about The New Face of War are the links between previous military revolutions and our own transformations. Two that standout are the Internet and asymmetrical warfare. The Internet, Berkowitz shows, is not new. The development of spin off technologies, such as the telegraph and semaphore flags, linked Civil War commanders on the first information net. Second, Berkowitz shows that asymmetrical warfare has existed for centuries. The most striking example is the comparison between the 1993 attack on the U.S.S. Cole by al-Qaeda terrorists and the 1864 attack on the U.S.S. Housatonic by the submatine Hunley. Both attacks used small watercraft laden with explosives to attack larger and better-armed vessels.

Berkowitz is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a senior analyst at RAND. He is the author of American Security, Calculated Risks, and Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age. He is also a frequent contributor to the Wall Street Journal. The New Face of War is an easy read. He uses a number of historical examples to support his thesis. In addition, the notes and sources are of a quality expected of a RAND scholar. The only criticism is the book’s lack of solutions for the reader. Unlike Breaking the Phalanx or Fighting for the Future, Berkowitz’s book merely cautions the reader to not lose the information edge.

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When studying the Arab-Israeli Wars, this book and The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East: From the War of Independence Through Lebanon, Knopf Paperback, New York, 1983, by the late Chaim Herzog, are required classics on the subject. The War of Atonement was originally published in 1975, the author conducted numerous interviews from Israeli defense ministry officials down to the unit tank commander offering the clearest details of the tactics employed during the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, known to the Arabs as the Ramadan War. Herzog, who died in 1997, was a member of British forces in World War II before joining the Israeli Defense Forces, rising to become director of military intelligence and then President of Israel.

President Nixon is quoted as saying that the 1973 War was Israel’s Pearl Harbor and war colleges throughout the world devote hours to the study of this war. This 2003 paperback edition is published on the eve of the 30th anniversary of this war and should be redicous- ared by a variety of military readers. Readers of ARMOR magazine will enjoy the detailed descriptions of tank battles in the Sinai and Golan Heights, as well as the methods used by Arab forces to counter Israel’s advantage in rapid mobile armor. Intelligence specialists will find this a valuable lesson in indications and warnings, understanding the elaborate deception plan concocted by the Egyptians and Syrians prior to the start of hostilities.

Herzog begins by arguing that the roots of the 1973 Yom-Kippur War can be found in the lightning success of the 1967 Six-Day War. The Israelis, overcome with the success of the Six-Day War, settled into the belief that Arab forces could not take the initiative. For the first time, Israel began to discuss the options of strategic depth that the capture of the Sinai provided, the West Bank offered 40 miles of depth through the Judean Desert and the Golan Heights offered limited depth, less than 10 miles. The author points out that Israel began to have a more defensive posture building the massive Bar-Lev Line along the Suez Canal with objections raised by General Israel Tal, arguing that the series of towers and logisti-cal fortifications had become sitting targets for Egyptian air and artillery forces. The book de-tails how the Israeli general staff argued about the Bar-Lev Line being a warning or defensive system. This lack of clarity, the book ex-plains, is why Israel’s defense leaders would be surprised.

The Egyptians and Syrians began studying the 1967 Six-Day War in detail; the Arabs began their first serious assessment of every Arab-Israeli War and engagement. They un-derstood the speed with which IDF reserves could mobilize to answer Egyptian and Syrian attacks; they designed a plan to give the Israelis little of the 72 hours required for ef-fective mobilization. The Israelis would have less than a 24-hour notice of a planned attack, which began on two fronts (Syrian and Egypt-ian) on 6 October at 1400 hours local time. The Arab plan also capitalized on the amount of their infantry and equipped them with SAG-GER antitank missiles and rocket-propelled grenades to counter Israel’s reliance on mo-bile armor with little to no infantry.

Herzog takes readers first to the critical Syr-ian Front; due to the proximity of the Syrian border to northern Israeli cities there was no margin for error. The 5th, 7th, and 9th Syrian infantry divisions hugged the entire length of the Golan Heights and were reinforced by the 1st and 3rd Syrian armored divisions. The Is-raelis focused their defense around Kuneitra and paid no attention to Brigadier General Pa-ful Eytan’s warning of the potential for Syria to concentrate its efforts on Kuneitra and the Rafid openings simultaneously. In the opening hours of the war, 60 Israeli tanks faced murderous artillery fire and 600 Syrian main battle tanks. Herzog describes how the Syr-ian armor order of battle consisted of tank doz-ers and bridging tanks leading their armored column in formation. The Israeli brigade picked off Syrian armor, yet they still came in forma-tion. The book also discusses stories of indi-vidual Israeli tank commanders and gives a firsthand account of several of their personal experiences.

The author admires the methods Egypt and Syria used to find solutions to Israeli military proficiency. Initial Israeli air strikes into Egypt and Syria were met with a forest of surface-to-air missiles. Israeli’s 7th Brigade realized they had to get out of range from Syrian artill-ery, regroup, and maneuver around the Syr-ian 7th Infantry, which was reinforced by the Syrian 3rd Armored Infantry. Maps take read-ers from the initial Syrian breakout on 6 Octo-ber to the Israeli counterstrike on 10 October.

On the Egyptian front, soldiers exercised along the Suez so that Israelis became desensitized as to when the real war would break out. Six October looked like a regular day along the Suez Canal, with Egyptian troops swimming and fishing along the canal. The difference came at 1400 hours, when 2,000 cannons, 240 planes, and 3,000 tons of ordnance land-ed on the 14 Israeli fortifications along the Bar-Lev Line. Herzog estimates 175 shells per sec-ond. What seemed like the Egyptians driving their pontoon bridge on the water’s edge looked like what they did on a regular basis, except this time the bridges opened and rubber boats were placed in the water. Within hours, over 8,000 Egyptian troops overwhelmed more than 500 Israeli troops manning the Bar-Lev Line.

Eventually, IDF units cornered the Egyptian 3rd Army and were able to push back Syrian tank divisions, opening the road to Damas-cus. Herzog describes the relationship of Is-raeli field commanders under the pressures of war. In addition, the book goes into the super-power politics of the United States and the So-viet Union.

The final chapter describes lessons learned by the Israelis, with a focus on the intelligence...
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Mexican and Central American Armor
by Julio Montes, Darlington Productions, Darlington, MD, illustrated throughout with black and white photographs plus color section, 175 pp., $19.95.

Although close to home for many ARMOR readers, most will not know much of what Central America has in the way of armored forces. What is there and where it is located is usually little known outside each nation’s own borders, apart from official military intelligence communities or reading basic details in heavy-weight and expensive specialist publications. Some countries possess large numbers of modern armor, while others have more modest levels of equipment, which is not always new. Most of these nations do not actively publicize details of their armed forces, which means a lot of research is needed to discover their vehicle holdings.

Julio Montes has made an in-depth study in this area and equally, if not more, importantly made the results available in this book. It covers eight countries, in alphabetical order Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. In recent times, this region has seen several major and minor conflicts, as well as tensions within and amongst its nations, one of which resulted in building and maintaining various armored vehicles. Usually, these come from the major producing nations, typically the United States, Great Britain, France, and the former Soviet Union, reflecting various allegiances and recent sales and disposal efforts, though several countries have designed and built their own equipment.

The countries covered vary greatly, some have very few vehicles and the extent in which they are understandably short, but the author does provide a complete picture. Others have a wide range of vehicles, tracked and wheeled, in service and this account includes short histories of each country’s armored heritage. In some cases, this goes back to even before the 1920s and 1930s, though most received their first armor during or just after World War II. Some of these vehicles remained in service for many years and some even survived into a new century in various degrees of modernization. Most of the modern vehicles are stock items, such as Commandos, Scorpions, and T-55s, differing only in color and markings from those in larger armies. Others are second hand, so you can find out where old Belgian AMX-13s and AMX-VCIs or German Saladins ended up. But where else can you see WWII-era halftracks and M8 armored cars still in service today?

Alongside these, this book includes descriptions and photos of the various locally designed and manufactured armored vehicles. In most cases, these are unique, as well as unusual such as rebuilt M114 APCs and a range of designs of patrol and personnel carriers built on commercial chassis. There are over 240 black and white photos, plus eight color pages that illustrate current and older equipment with specifications of those designs unique to this region and orders of battle for each nation, including what vehicles they have in current service. Also included are vehicle mounted anti-tank weapons and details of other equipment, making this a comprehensive survey, shedding much new light on a neglected subject.

PETER BROWN


John Poole continues to do our nation and the military great service. Phantom Soldier is the third in an evolution of books — Last Hundred Yards and One More Bridge to Cross — that gets it right on future battlefield tactics.

This book must be read and implemented as part of Transformation. Poole’s book provides the blue print for reforming U.S. ground forces for the 21st century. We will pay with lives if we do not reform our military from a second-generation warfare force to one that can deal with threats in third- and fourth-generation warfare.

This is a truly influential book, written by a former Marine who has tested and experienced small-unit tactics, unlike today’s experts we see today talking about the war in Afghanistan. It shows the oriental equivalent to the Jager or Sturm infantry concept of maneuver warfare. It contrasts with the U.S. Army’s attrition based air-land battle doctrine. It covers topics like mission orders, recon pull, decision cycles and tempo, use of the reserves, commander’s intent, and other key concepts that teach a junior military leader how (versus what) to think.

Based on the oriental approach to warfare, which when combined with the German approach to warfare, evolved into revolutionary OODA-cycle theories, Poole shows how a quick acting, agile force can constantly beat larger, heavier-equipped foes. After reading this book you will understand exactly why the oriental forces, while occasionally losing tactically, overall are so effective operationally against the larger and better-equipped U.S. forces.

The book is divided into three parts: “The Eastern Way of War,” “The Differences in Tactical Technique,” and “The Next Disappearing Act.” The critical part is the first part, which explains in clear, understandable terms how maneuver warfare works from the infantry prospective. The other two parts offer practical examples, using extensive historical quotes, to teach junior leaders these concepts.

The Marines attempted these ideas for their land-war doctrine in the late 1990s, but because they failed to evolve the culture (or people aspect) with the ideas, the Marines have gone back to attrition. Even so, doctrine involving infiltration was so effective in combat against the Iraqis in 1990 that the U.S. VII Corps had to move up its attack by approximately 48 hours to prevent the Iraqis from completely escaping before the Marines pushed them out of Kuwait.

This book will serve for years as an unoffcial “bible” (alongside William Lind’s Maneuver Warfare Handbook) for maneuver warfare officers looking for a resource to help train junior leaders critical maneuver warfare concepts. While many look for technological answers to fourth-generation warfare, this book gives ideas that apply instead to people and tactics. It leaves the reader with a solid understanding how men make decisions in combat, as well as how to translate that knowledge to a military advantage. It is a must-have book for combat arms officers and junior leaders.

This book suggests recorded history can sometimes change as one comes to better know his highly deceptive opponent. It talks about what goes on at the nitty-gritty level of infantry combat: the squads, platoons, companies, and battalions. It shows how various systems succeed or fail at tasks, such as flexibility, maneuver, combat cohesion, and morale, and why the German army was generally qualitatively superior to both Western and Eastern rivals in both world wars.

Because of the depth of his subject, Poole necessarily has to stick to a discussion of the light infantry aspect of what is admittedly a much bigger area of knowledge.

On the whole, this is an excellent book. The concepts and techniques that Poole is trying to get across are not new or original, as he implicitly states, but the genius he shows is in explaining it all so clearly and then applying it to modern situations. The style of writing is very easy to follow, and the book was a joy to read. The more I read, the more lights came on in my head.

While I couldn’t say that I am now an expert on this approach to war (or even competent at it), understanding the principles behind it means I can begin to apply and practice them. This book is ideal reading for anyone in the senior lieutenant level, as a primer for junior staff courses (although instructors tend to preach maneuver and then practice attrition, it will still help you). It should be required reading for all officers who take their calling seriously. If nothing else, it will encourage debate, and that is always healthy and desirable.

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