

REVIEWS

Spirit, Blood, and Treasure, edited by Donald Vandergriff, Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 2001, 424 pages, \$34.95.

Editor Donald Vandergriff has compiled a useful, if slightly unfocused, collection of articles examining what he considers the central challenge of the modern defense establishment: how to adapt to the new paradigm of warfare in the 21st century. The editor, an *ARMOR* contributor, believes that our third-generation armed forces are hamstrung, spiritually and physically, when faced with the lurking threat of fourth-generation combat. This requires fundamental changes in equipment, culture, organization, and acquisition... well, just about everything.

Vandergriff offers an excellent introduction that summarizes his view of the problem, while his line-up of authors address various slices of the reform pie. The articles are grouped into three categories: People, Ideas, and Hardware/Budgets. The subjects covered range from revamping the infantry squad to overhauling the federal budgetary process. There is a central theme, however, running through these otherwise disparate pieces, that gives this book a modicum of coherence. It is a reflection of the Toffleresque observation that a society makes war like it makes money. Vandergriff *et al* want the Defense Department to use information technology to allow for greater decentralization while exploiting the talents of specialists working within a commander's intent. This applies to tactics, to assignment and promotion of personnel, or to the purchase of hardware. In other words, we need to embrace the tenets of fourth-generation warfare, or risk defeat.

The smorgasbord of articles is both a strength and weakness of the book. In general, the quality is high — no Hackworth-style diatribes or ghostwritten glorified press releases that seem to fill most of the professional journals nowadays. There are a few exceptions. John Poole's article on minimizing the use of force suffers from radical-chic operational theory and egregiously bad history; John Tillson's suggestions on reforming the personnel system is on target in identifying the problem, but I shudder to think of the consequences if his solutions are ever foisted on the Army. The rest of the selections range from pedestrian (albeit useful) to truly innovative or revelatory. Most of them cover ground that will be very familiar to thoughtful professionals — there is actually very little here that I would categorize as revolutionary in scope or tone — but I suspect that everyone will find some material here to learn from. I certainly found Franklin Spinney's excellent piece on the budget process an eye-opener, and Daniel Moore's and Christopher Yunker's article on carrier operations should be required reading in Newport.

I offer, then, a qualified recommendation for this book. It will have a very short shelf life, as all works of this nature do, but it is a well-

balanced and judicious look at issues that must be resolved soon if we are to adapt successfully to life after the Cold War.

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Somalia on \$5.00 a Day, A Soldier's Story by Martin Stanton, Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 2000, 299 pages, \$24.95 hardcover.

Read this book. Marty Stanton has done all of us a service. Stanton wrote of his experiences, warts and all, during his tour of duty in Somalia on Operation Restore Hope. He pulls no punches talking about what went well, what was fouled up, and how he and his battalion S3 section and the battalion command team and staff of TF 2-87 IN played the hand they had been dealt in the poker game that was Somalia. He gives the "big picture" and then what he and his battalion did when faced with a series of situations dealing with bandits, NGOs, clan elders, and our own national policy.

I was serving on the XVIII Airborne Corps staff when Operation Restore Hope started. The driving concerns coming from Washington appeared to be: keep the number of troops in theater under the strength ceiling, and suffer no casualties. Stanton faced the on-the-ground reality of the troop ceiling. He describes the incredible challenges of covering a huge area with a light infantry battalion that walked to the fight. The missions changed, the conditions changed, but the troopers of TF 2-87 soldiered on.

The struggle of the troop ceiling as a means of controlling "mission creep" and the need to accomplish missions in the name of force protection comes across loud and clear. Deployed commanders are hard pressed to say, "No, we can't do that." They are in theater and must deal with the situation as it changes on the ground. Stanton shows us that the troop ceiling effectively limited legitimate operations that were needed to accomplish force objectives. I know that the ceilings come from policy makers, but as war is an extension of policy, those of us who serve, or will serve, in D.C. must make civilians understand what is needed to attain policy objectives and ensure it *is* enough to afford the field commander freedom of action.

Personnel policy mandates also plagued the battalion. Stanton described having to take a company commander out of command in theater in order to meet the requirements of the captain's functional area education requirements. Stanton's battalion lost men to ANCOC, CAS3, as well as the steady drain of emergency leaves and non-battle injury. He effectively describes the feeling of "no one outside Somalia" understands what we are doing, and he was right. If our Army corrects one thing based on this

report and our growing experience with the new forms of war we are facing, it must be that our personnel policy must realize the nature of deployments and leave troops in place for the duration of the operation.

I was struck by one portion of the book, one that reminded me of an episode in Larteguy's book about a French colonial parachute regiment in Algeria, *The Centurions*. Stanton describes a counter-bandit operation wherein TF 2-87 beat the bushes for bandit hideouts, much like they'd operated at the Joint Readiness Training Center when fighting OPFOR guerrillas. He then realized that the bandits were living in the town, and thus the task force had to adapt its operations to patrolling the towns where the bandits lived. Based on this and other experiences, Stanton outlines extremely useful lessons learned in this book.

This is a superb book written from the heart. Here is what American soldiers will face in the new age we live in — war that is not quite war, but men still facing fire. Stanton and his troopers faced fire with honor.

Stanton's book has an honored place on my bookshelf. I'll read this one over and over again. This is a soldier's report written for soldiers. I intend to recommend it to my civilian friends as well. As I wrote in the opening line, **read this book!**

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The Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study translated and edited by David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1999, 349 pages, \$62.50.

Until the 1990s, most students of World War II recognized that the Red Army was the force most responsible for defeating Nazi Germany, but there was an unwillingness to give the Soviets their due. Many writers argued that the Russians overwhelmed the Germans with manpower ratios as high as 15-1. The problem with this interpretation is that the Germans proved in 1940 that they could defeat a force superior in size with better weapons. The reluctance to give the Soviets the credit they had rightly earned is easy to fathom. The West had to rehabilitate the Germans if they were going to be accepted as allies. There was an equal reluctance to build up a nation that might easily become the next great enemy. The Soviet regime denied historians access to their archives because the Red Army planned to use the same tactics and doctrine against NATO forces should the Cold War turn into World War III.

The beginning of the end for the Third Reich came in 1943. The Battle of Kursk was Hitler's last offensive in the East. For a week the Germans made only limited gains. Then,

outside the village of Prokhorovka, the Fourth Panzer Army and the Fifth Guards Tank Army fought the biggest tank battle ever. The Fifth Guards failed in their mission of going on the offensive, but their defensive victory brought the German effort to an end. A Soviet counteroffensive then sent the Germans reeling. Anyone doubting the factors behind the outcome should read this study. In 1940, the Germans defeated the British-French-Belgium force with local superiority at the various points of contact and a better tactical use of tanks. Three years later, the Soviets dominated the local scenes of action and used better defensive tactics than their Western allies had employed earlier in the war. The organization of this study makes sense, starting with a chapter that provides an overall assessment of the situation the Red Army faced on the eve of the battle. Chapters follow on defensive preparations, German operations, and the battle itself. The study then moves into a topical examination of the combat and combat support branches during this engagement. The only shortcoming of the Soviet General Staff was their failure to devote full chapters to the important issues of logistics and intelligence. As the editors note, the study also tends to overestimate the German strength, which is understandable given the limited information of combat, and ignores an examination of the costs of the engagement. The study focuses on operational matters and is free of ideological baggage even if it uses some loaded terms to describe the Germans.

Maps are the main shortcoming of this volume. The editors used the Soviet originals, but the quality of these 50-year-old images was never that great to begin with and are often irregular in size. As a result, the published versions have weak, thin lines, are missing important terrain details, and often appear on two pages making it difficult to make sense of things when the binding gets in the way. The editors have added several maps at the end of this work, which makes up for some of the problems with the originals, but a couple of them are also poor in quality.

Should active duty Armor personnel bother to read this work? Yes, this work was designed for a professional audience. A reader can profit from examining this study as a good example of a thorough report and a staff producing optimal work even while operating under the stress of war.

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Clash of Arms, How the Allies Won in Normandy by Russell A. Hart, Lynne Rienne Publishers, Boulder, Colo., 2001, 469 pages, with index, \$79.95.

Professor Russell Hart is the newest in a line of academic military historians to attempt the resurrection of the reputation of the American army in the Second World War. In

this effort, he is largely successful. This work is the most comprehensive, academically grounded and logical evaluation of the relative combat capabilities of the four armies in Normandy to date. Hart's evidence is solid, his arguments reasonable, and in *Clash of Arms* he brings something new to the table, a comparative analysis of American, British, Canadian and German combat effectiveness that no other scholar has attempted to date in this depth. I strongly recommend this book to professionals.

As historian Dennis Showalter notes in the foreword to this work, "since 1945 a virtual cult of the Wehrmacht has emerged among its former enemies." Hart notes that until the emergence of a broader strain of military history appeared in the 1970s and 1980s, Germany's former opponents (and most especially we Americans) generally accepted the sanitized version of German army military history that emerged in the immediate post-war period. Much of that history relied upon the testimony of German army generals and generally subscribed to the idea that the *Heer* (army) was apolitical. A sort of "Nazis? Nope, no Nazis here," approach developed for several reasons, not the least of which was our very real need to rearm the Germans in the face of Soviet intransigence and the developing Cold War. The reverse side of that trend was a general denigration of American combat abilities and the idea that we won the war only through the mass of material that we, as a nation, could produce and throw at the Germans. Hart reverses this trend with authority. America's greatest strength, it appears, was not just our ability to wage "materialschlacht," but our ability to adapt and change to the conditions as they were, not as we wanted them to be.

The book is divided into two parts. Fully half the book is taken up with an analysis of what went on in the development of the national military forces of all four subject nations prior to the Normandy Campaign of 1944. Starting with the Interwar period (WWI to WWII) Hart delves deeply into the foundations of military theory, the relation of theory to practical resource limitations, and the interaction of both with the culture of the armed forces of all four nations. Although this portion of the book rests fairly heavily upon secondary scholarship, Hart is generally on solid ground here. If there is any critique to be made it is that he is probably too soft on the Americans during this period, setting them up as adaptive and willing to learn when the reality was that the interwar period was one of our worst, not just economically but culturally. The interwar U.S. Army fostered a divisive culture of reactive "us against them" conflict, and both sides were American. (Branch warfare inside the ground forces, the ground-vs.-air fighting, Army vs. liberal civilians, etc.) So in this one small area, it appears that Hart is too kind by half.

The next four chapters, however, make this book worth the purchase price in a variety of ways. Each chapter delves deeply and deals

with the experiences of one nation between 1939 and June 1944. Each chapter could stand alone as a monograph, which makes them perfectly suited for OPDs, or to supplement a battalion commander's "Required Reading List" for lieutenants pulling duty (assuming the unit is creating a "Battalion Library" and will foot the cost of purchase of a copy). The chapter on the Americans alone is fascinating. Learning how the American Army expanded from around 225,000 to 1.5 million in 18 months, then from there to more than 7 million in another year and a half, is interesting. Learning how we did all of this and simultaneously managed to learn (or unlearn as required) how to beat the Germans on the battlefield is a perfect case study for professionals today. Although Hart devotes a chapter to this, it boils down to a simple sentence. The Americans, unlike their allies, were culturally willing to toss aside equipment and ideas that did not work as demonstrated on the battlefield and search for things (equipment, doctrine, organizations) that did work. That is no small statement, and it takes Hart a chapter to prove it, but it is a chapter well worth reading.

In contrast to the Americans, our British allies, according to Hart (himself an Englishman), were hamstrung initially by a strong aversion to professionalism in the officer corps, and more importantly to a cultural tendency to follow a top-down approach. To be sure, there were bright spots. The British developed a very effective air-to-ground system that brought in effective Close Air Support (CAS). (Which, it should be noted, the Americans copied quickly and shamelessly, because it worked and their method did not.) At the same time he noted what he refers to as, "a weakness that plagued the British Army throughout the war: its vulnerable morale." As generally sympathetic as Hart is with the Americans, he seems to be very critical of British performance throughout. Still, by 1944 they had largely overcome their lack of interwar doctrinal foresight and developed a doctrine of firepower-based attrition that worked well enough to defeat most German forces arrayed against them.

Hart also addresses the Canadians and the Germans, and a more sophisticated picture of both emerges from his analysis. The Canadians suffered from the effects of near total demobilization in the interwar period, and, as a result, ended up fighting with equipment and doctrine that was essentially British. Hart's assessment was that they were a "poor clone" of the evolving British way of war. The Germans, with sound doctrine from the start, generally did well, and adapted to circumstances throughout the war. Here Hart's evaluation closely echoes that of some other recent scholars as he points out that while the tactical proficiency of the German *Heer* was fairly high, it was a lack of foresight and a cultural predisposition to undervalue supporting arms that created a fatal weakness in their system. In short, they made great tanks (and other weapons) that were useless because they could not be

resupplied. Too much attention went to the development and construction of wonderful weapons like the Panther and King Tiger, and not enough to the fielding of trucks. The result was that their panzers were tied, indirectly, to horse-drawn logistics. Hart also notes that the effects of Nazism reinforced the fighting ability of many German soldiers (as repugnant as that may be), but in the ultimate test of arms, all of their institutional flexibility at the cutting edge was secondary to their blind-spot just behind the front lines.

This is a solid work of analytical military history. Despite the title, Normandy is not necessarily the most important element found in this book. Every page, and most especially the half of the book leading up to the case study of the fighting in Normandy, contains information useful to professionals. It is a book that causes one to stop and consider our own military and our own professional culture and ask, "Are we flexible and adaptive?" In the end, that seems to be the most important military criteria of them all.

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Desert War: The North African Campaign, 1940-1943 by Alan Moorehead, Penguin Books, New York, 2001, 641 pages, \$19.00.

Desert War: The North African Campaign 1940-1943 is three books combined into one volume written by newspaper correspondent Alan Moorehead. *Desert War* is far from a definitive history of the North African campaign, rather much more of a rambling personal story of war. If one is looking for detailed accounts of the battles, the tactical doctrine of armored warfare in the 1940s, or an analysis of the American contribution to the campaign, then this is not the book to read. However, if one wants to experience an intimate account of the warfare, politics, geography, and diplomacy in North Africa, Moorehead's account is worth the time. His descriptions of the campaign are so detailed, fresh, and exciting that it is hard to put down once opened.

The reader follows the author in his journeys throughout a large part of the Middle East and Africa during the early phases of World War II. One travels from Egypt and Libya to Kenya, Ethiopia, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, with additional side trips to the United States and India. Traveling by boat, borrowed airplane, car, and foot, the reader experiences not only the battles, but also the sights, sounds, and smells of warfare. Moorehead writes in a typical journalistic style, complete with detailed metaphoric descriptions of his experiences. On the down side, the reader loses a sense of proportion because Moorehead is telling his story, and not providing a broader history of the campaign. However, the greatest disappointment

of the book is the author's failure to adequately address the American contribution to the war. Granted, the American armies did not arrive until late 1942, but one reference to Patton and four to Eisenhower are less than acceptable. Moorehead's lack of maps is also an annoyance, and unless one is extremely familiar with North Africa, an atlas is necessary to follow most of the action.

Despite these shortcomings, Moorehead's book is entertaining, enjoyable, and enlightening. The reader becomes disappointed when the book ends because one is eager to board a ship and travel with the allied armies to Sicily.

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Army of Hope, Army of Alienation: Culture and Contradiction in the American Army Communities of Cold War Germany by John P. Hawkins, Praeger Publishers, Westport, Conn., 2001, 332 pages, Appendix, Notes, Bibliography, Index, \$68.00.

Army of Hope, Army of Alienation is an anthropological study of soldiers and their families residing in Germany from 1986 to 1988. It chronicles military communities as they deal with the stresses associated with being the 'tip of the sword' facing the Soviet army during the Cold War. The author, a professor of anthropology at Brigham Young University, and a Medical Service Corps officer of the U.S. Army Reserve, lived in and observed a German military community during the years indicated. The Department of Military Psychiatry (now called Soldier and Family Studies), Division of Neuropsychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research sanctioned his work.

During his stay, the author interviewed over one hundred members of the community, including enlisted soldiers, NCOs, commanders, family members, and civilian employees. He lists these in an appendix in which he identifies his subjects by fictitious names so as to spare them any repercussions. The author also does not identify the subject military community, using instead a composite description.

The purpose of this work is to show how living in close proximity to danger, such as that posed by the Cold War, creates stress to such a degree that those in the community lose sight of their reasons for being there and react to the stress with careerism. According to the author, this careerism pervaded every level of the community and had a divisive impact on morale. His premise is that the low morale was unique to an assignment in Germany. That is, stateside units did not experience such problems. His purpose for publishing the study now — 13 years after completion — is to suggest that

the same problems exist in the post-Cold War Army, even in stateside assignments. The idea is that reading this study will somehow better enable current Army leaders to deal with morale problems in the twenty-first century.

This book, while shrouded in academic clothes, is nothing more than a loose collection of the predictable whining that soldiers, and those associated with soldiers, are wont to do. No subject escapes this study. It is chock-full of stories of woe regarding housing, the PX, medical care, the job, evaluations, and on into infinity. Every soldier, civilian, or family member throughout the history of this or any other army has complained at one time or another about every one of the issues brought out in this book. Why the author would think that these issues are unique to Germany, the subject community, or the time period studied is beyond comprehension.

This book offers nothing of use to the soldier. Those who do read it will either accept the tall tales, or discount them as routine griping, depending upon their own convictions regarding the Army. Either way, they will not learn much that will make them better leaders. It is good that this book is so expensive, as the price will probably cause the book to stay where it belongs; on library and bookstore shelves.

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Lost Soldiers by James Webb, Bantam, New York, 2001, 384, \$25.00.

Lost Soldiers is a novel about a former U.S. Marine-turned investigator. He travels extensively throughout Vietnam to search for lost prisoners of war and those missing in action. He uncovers things that he did not bargain for — deceit, falsehoods, and cowardice complicate the investigation and pursuit with interesting twists. Unfortunately, this was not enough to keep me turning the pages. The book got very detailed in areas that didn't need to be. There is no doubt that James Webb is a subject matter expert and very educated as a traveler throughout Vietnam; however, for anyone looking for a simple story, like myself, it was a bit much. This would be a fine study in a literature class about a man's struggle with himself, society's prejudices, and the foes of the past, but not a book that I could read over and over again.

I would not recommend *Lost Soldiers* to my Cavalry brothers unless they were into critical reading. This isn't a Tom Clancy novel; that is for sure.

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Panzer IV: The Panzerkampfwagen IV Medium Tank, 1939-1945 by Kevin Hjermstad, Squadron/Signal Productions, Carrollton, Texas, 2000, 64 pages, \$9.95 (ISBN 0-89747-413-9).

Advantages: Good primer on the Pzkw IV series of tanks.

Disadvantages: No sourcing of photos, competing in a busy environment.

Rating: Highly recommended.

Recommendation: For modelers and historians not familiar with the mainstay tank of the German Wehrmacht for most of the Second World War.

Most publishers recognize a natural hierarchy of military historical books. Aircraft books outsell all others by a wide margin, quoted variously as being from three to six times that of any other genre. German WWII subjects outsell all others by a similar ratio. The result is that a new book on German aircraft or armor runs into a very competitive market because many publishers will choose these subjects as salable.

As a result, in many cases we get very bad books with many all-too-familiar pictures. In other cases, very good books tend to get overlooked or remaindered as of little interest even when they have good subjects and fresh photos. At the end of the day, it is up to the customer and historian to rate the subjects, either with their pocketbooks or their assessments.

This is the first book in Squadron/Signal's new "Armor Special" series, as opposed to the more familiar and popular "In Action" series, which set the standard for all of the other competitors out there, such as Schiffer, Concord, and Armada. This book comes from a new author, Kevin Hjermstad, and covers the basic differences in the various Panzerkampfwagen IV tanks, from their initial production in 1937 to the final models built in 1945. The book has around 180 photos and eight pages of color side views of the tank as it evolved, showing how paint schemes changed to meet the area and threat environment. Although the book is very well done, my one complaint is that none of the photos are sourced, nor is there any credit given as to where the photos originated. I freely admit to having no knowledge of whether the photos are "fresh" or not, but they are all new to me and appear very well selected to match the author's focus.

The main problem is that I am not sure how this book will be received. It is better than the same publisher's "In Action" volume on the Pzkw IV, as it is much bigger, and contains more and better photos. But again, it is competing with the earlier Squadron book and the similar Schiffer products. And the "nuts and bolts" crowd would probably prefer the books from Spielberg and Jentz/Doyle, so I am not sure if they will be interested in this book as well. This is kind of a shame, as it is

really a pretty good overview of the tank. Most modelers will be happy with it as it provides enough information to do a good job with the DML and Tamiya kits of this vehicle.

COOKIE SEWELL
AMPS

War in Korea: 1950-1953 by D.M. Giangreco, Presidio Press, Inc., Novato, Calif., 2000, 352 pages, \$50.00, hardcover.

If, as the old saying goes, "A picture is worth a thousand words," D.M. Giangreco really gives readers their money's worth. This lavishly illustrated book of more than 500 black-and-white photographs captures the essence of the Korean War, the "Forgotten War" or, as some of my airborne buddies who served with the 187th ARCT (The Rakkasans) in Korea note, "Communism's First Defeat."

The author is the design editor at *Military Review*, and has written other books on military/political subjects. The Korean War, like all wars, is politics with heavy machinery and a cast of hundreds of thousands. It starts by having both the West and the Communists misreading what the other said. As the war begins, we see the result of U.S. occupation forces in Japan being mentally and physically unprepared for possible action. The cry of "No more Task Force Smiths" goes back to the Korean War's opening month, and it shows how an ill-prepared and poorly armed unit was crushed by the advancing North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA). His description of Korea ("Korea is roughly the size of California south of San Francisco or Italy north of Naples. It enjoys the pleasant climate of neither.") will bring back memories of the weather to all who served there.

The map at the beginning of each chapter shows the ebb and flow of the war, and where the main fighting occurred. The retreat to Pusan, the build-up of forces in the Pusan perimeter, the landing at Inchon, the pursuit north to retake Seoul, changing war aims, overconfidence, and an unwillingness to face unpleasant realities, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) intervention, with the Chosin Reservoir withdrawal and the Hungnam evacuation, the retreat below Seoul (Seoul changed hands four times during the War, Pyongyang twice), the removal of MacArthur, Ridgway's leadership in the march north in the spring of 1951, the air and sea wars, the stalemate along the front from the summer of 1951, vicious small unit actions, the last big pushes by the CCF/NKPA to grab land and "punish" the ROK Army literally up to the signing of the documents, and the final signing of the armistice are covered succinctly in the accompanying text. Mr. Giangreco illuminates the role other UN forces played in the fighting, and also deals with the murder of POWs and civilians by the NKPA/CCF. His pictures of psychological operations on both sides and the problems

with the prisoner repatriation (that one issue held up the armistice for 15 months) were very informative. He points out that the French battalion with the 2nd Infantry Division left Korea for Vietnam, and became the core of *Groupement Mobile 100*, destroyed by the Viet Minh in a series of ambushes that stretched over 30 miles. Read Bernard Fall's *Street Without Joy* to see the problem of being road-bound against a light infantry force in restrictive terrain.

But what struck me was the extent of Korea's up-and-down terrain. I never served there, so I wasn't really sure what it was like. I recently got a new CD program called the *Rand McNally New Millennium World Atlas Deluxe* to help me better visualize terrain in places of interest to me. I'm a gunner; I look at terrain because I have to be able to best support the commander's intent and his plan of movement to achieve his objectives, while figuring out how best to stop the other guy from preventing our success. My preference for field artillery is self-propelled (my first unit was 5/14th FA — 155mm M109, without any suffixes — 2AD at Ft. Hood a few years ago), and lots of that. You can never have too much of certain things: good companions, ammunition, and firepower are good examples. As *aficionados* and practitioners of mobile warfare know, Korea will never be mistaken for Ft. Hood or Riley, so how does the constraint of terrain affect the use of armored forces? Will it be platoons attached to support light infantry, dug in as hardened, mobile pillboxes to control areas, restricted by terrain and lack of engineer support? Will the only real battalion-sized armor fights happen in the opening stages, when both sides clash before each air force tries to hunt tanks, a la Kosovo? Are we learning how to better use armor in restricted terrain, like Kosovo, against potential anti-armor hunter-killer teams? And what do those hills mean to our Cavalry brethren, flying helicopters against an enemy who knows how we will fight?

This is an excellent book for all soldiers to read and would be a perfect addition to a unit or personal library. It reminds everyone of the eternal truth written in another great book on Korea, T.R. Fehrenbach's *This Kind of War*: "...You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life — but if you desire to defend it, protect it and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men in the mud." Since the end of WWII, pundits have proclaimed the end of Armor and the Army. Since then, all the military actions we have seen merely reinforce what Fehrenbach stated. It might be wise for all of us to think about war in compartmentalized spaces, and thank Mr. Giangreco for bringing the reality of that kind of fighting to light in such a powerful way.

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