East German Plans for the Conquest and Occupation of West Berlin

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Author’s Note

A tendency is emerging in Germany of downplaying the very real dangers that existed in the Cold War in the interest of national and international reconciliation. Members of the former East German Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) publicly claim that their military, just like that of West Germany, served the interest of peace by promoting a continental balance of power. At a Christmas service in the Berlin Cathedral last December, members of the French, British, American, and Russian forces were all thanked for their contributions to peace over the last 40 years. Wary of aggravating the wounds left by the Cold War, some seek to claim that NATO and the Warsaw Pact were mirror images of each other, equally dangerous and yet equally stabilizing.

While the details of NATO’s war plans remain shrouded in official secrecy, it is now possible to reconstruct many of the plans of the Warsaw Pact. Among the most interesting of these were the continually updated plans of the East German government regarding how West Berlin would be occupied and administered. Berlin had long been a bone in the throat of the East German government, and the records reveal that plans for its conquest were being maintained well into the 1980s. The latest East German plans for Berlin’s occupation can be reconstructed from existing exercise documents of the NVA, the statements of former NVA officers, and the files of the Ministry for State Security.

Border’s Edge 86

The Border’s Edge (Bordkante) series of exercises held by the staffs of the NVA, the East German Frontier Troops, and the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany between 1985 and 1988 dealt with operations against a major urban area. While a cover identity was presented in each case (Border’s Edge 1985 and 1986 dealt with operations in the East German city of Magdeburg while Border’s Edge 1987 and 1988 concerned operations in Leipzig), the real focus of all exercises was West Berlin. This becomes clear if one studies the records. A glimpse at the files of the exercise from which the most documents remain, Border’s Edge 86, substantiates that Berlin was the real focus of the exercise and illustrates exactly how Berlin was to be occupied.

Border’s Edge 86 was held between 30 June and 2 July 1986. The purpose of the exercise was to improve the “decision-making, planning, and organization of mixed assault formations engaged in joint operations against a major urban area... causing a collapse of enemy resistance through the occupation of urban districts, important facilities, and the city center.”

Documents from the exercise allude to the capture of Magdeburg, a regional capital in the Western portion of the German Democratic Republic. The accompanying map of Magdeburg indicates that it was defended by an American, a British, and a French brigade. The locations of the Allied Kommandatura, the headquarters of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Free Democratic Party, the Abgeordnetenhaus, the Regierender Bürgermeister; and border crossing checkpoints were also marked — the exercise certainly concerned West Berlin rather than Magdeburg.

The scenario at the commencement of the exercise was described as follows: “Western provocations cause increasing tensions in the international sphere. NATO utilizes the cover of large-scale exercises scheduled for mid-June in order to rapidly expand its forces in Europe. A “Basic Alarm” order is issued [by NATO] on the evening of the 28th June. Steps are taken to reinforce the troops in Magdeburg... with additional forces.”

“Eastern” forces number 35,000 men. These consist of the NVA’s 1st Motorized Rifle Division — composed of three motorized infantry regiments, an armored regiment, and an artillery regiment — the Soviet 6th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade stationed in East Berlin, nine regiments of East German Frontier Troops, a paratroop battalion, an additional artillery regiment, a mortar section, a fighter-bomber squadron, a transport helicopter squadron, three helicopter sections, two reconnaissance airplanes, an assault engineer battalion, a bridge-laying battalion, and three “People’s Police Alert Units” (each equivalent to an infantry battalion). These units as a whole were termed the “Special Group” which was to be protected from aerial assault by a SAM brigade and fighter aircraft.

Total hardware consisted of 334 tanks, 186 armored personnel carriers, 36 MiG-21 bombers, 2 reconnaissance airplanes, 52 helicopters, 354 guns and mortars above 82mm, and 189 antitank pieces.

The fighter-bomber squadron would initiate combat operations with a 9-minute strike against Allied command posts, communication facilities, and the airport. This would be followed by three artillery bombardments of 11, 8, and 16 minutes. The goal of the artillery bombardments would be the destruction of enemy artillery and mortar batteries, antitank and antiair units, and...
the tactical nuclear weapons assumed to be stationed in the city. Follow-on tasking included containing Allied breakout attempts. The helicopter and fixed wing transports would land and supply airborne troops, as well as conduct aerial reconnaissance and artillery spotting tasks.10

Ground forces were to move along eight different routes to their jumping off positions. The timetable allotted seven hours for troop movement from assembly areas to the line of departure. Another three hours were set aside for final preparations. In order to maintain secrecy, the line of departure was at least 1 to 3 kilometers from the East German—“Magdeburg” frontier.11

Twenty-nine minutes before the start of the operation, combat engineers would ready border crossing points and conduct breaches through border installations. On Day 1 and Day 2 of the assault, the “Special Group” would split “Magdeburg’s” defenders into two groups. Defending units that continued to resist would be destroyed on Day 3 and 4, and the entire city would be occupied. An order of the commander of the “Special Group” instructed that the National Library, the Museum, the Cathedral, and the State Library should be regarded as cultural treasures whose destruction should be avoided if combat operations permitted.12

The division of enemy forces was the primary task of the first day of operations. The primary assault, intended to drive a wedge between the British and American brigades, was entrusted to the First Motorized Rifle Division, its armored regiment, and a regiment of Frontier Troops. Once the British and American brigades were divided, they were to be subjected to a second blow designed to shatter resistance. Assessments of enemy capabilities judged that “Western” forces in “Magdeburg” would only be able to “build up a hasty and provisional system of strongpoints. A withdrawal of enemy forces from peripheral defenses into the city center was to be prevented. Bloody house-by-house combat was to be avoided by skillful application of force.13

The role of the various Politorgans (Political Organs) in the conquest of West Berlin is especially interesting. One of their primary missions was to weaken the resolve of the enemy Allied soldiers and West German police in “Magdeburg,” who were to be convinced that it was futile to “sacrifice their lives in a hopeless struggle.” French soldiers were to be persuaded that they were defending American rather than French interests, a task unworthy of them. The British were likewise to be induced against forfeiting their lives for American war goals. Americans were to be reminded that their forces had never triumphed over socialist forces.14

The Politorgans also planned to manipulate the German civilian population, encouraging both active and passive resistance to a bloody and prolonged defense of the city. A propaganda section — complete with mobile printing-press, editorial facilities, and a pamphlet mortar for “agitation grenades” — would be responsible for radio and loudspeaker announcements and leaflet distribution. Leaflets would also be distributed by aircraft. The political departments were to have over 70,000 safe-passage passes ready for distribution. Another 90,000 instruction sheets were to be on hand, providing guidance to the civilian population pertaining to conduct in war zones and behavior toward the troops of the GDR and Soviet Union.

The third task of the Politorgans would be to encourage NVA troops in the performance of their soldierly duties. The commander of the First Front, a Soviet general, would issue an appeal to the troops which would be recorded on 50 tapes and played to all elements of the assault force. Lest motivation degenerate into rampage, 10,000 handbills were to be prepared and distributed concerning “Conduct toward the Civilian Population of the Enemy.”15

The preceding summary of Border’s Edge (Bordkante) 86 is illustrative of the various exercises focusing on the capture of West Berlin. While the exercises in 1985 and 1986 allegedly concerned the capture of Magdeburg, and those of 1987 and 1988 the occupation of Leipzig, an analysis of “enemy” forces, the layout of the city, and government structures reveals that Berlin was the focus of the entire Border’s Edge series of exercises. Another Border’s Edge exercise was to have been staged in late October 1989. As in the previous two years, the focus of operations centered on the capture of “Leipzig.” NATO forces consisted of the 28th U.S. Infantry Division and elements of the 194th Armored Brigade of the I U.S. Army Corps. Following the containment of a NATO attack, these forces were to be encircled and captured.16 While a staff exercise was held between the 17th and 18th of May 1989, the exercise itself was never staged. The tumultuous chain of events that led to German unification, in late 1989 and the first half of 1990, ensured that no further Border’s Edge exercises were staged.

The Destroyed Operational Plans

The scenario envisioned in the exercise Border’s Edge 86 closely resembled the concrete operational plans for the conquest of West Berlin. The written documents concerning these plans were destroyed in 1990 as unification loomed closer, but several former officers of the NVA have been willing to discuss the actual plan of operation.17

The operational plan was code named “THRUST” (German: STOSS). It concerned the occupation of West Berlin “within the scope of preventive actions following prior aggression by NATO outside the Central European area, for example an attack by Turkey on Bulgaria.” Berlin was to be occupied “while NATO was transporting its reinforcements from overseas and before the opening of military operations” along the intra-German and Czechoslovakian-German borders.18 In 1987, following the introduction of the new Soviet military doctrine, certain changes were made. The plan was renamed “CENTER” (German: ZENTRUM), and West Berlin was now to be occupied only “following NATO aggression resulting in the violation of state [East Germany] borders.”19
Following the political decision to occupy West Berlin, a “Berlin Group” field command would be formed out of the East German Army High Command, located in Wildpark West near Potsdam.20 The “Berlin Group” command was to direct over 32,000 East German and Soviet troops against an estimated 12,000 Allied troops and 6,000 West Berlin policemen. The equipment levels used in Border’s Edge 86 would be significantly raised in real operations — approximately 390 tanks, 450 guns and mortars, 400 antitank units, and 400 armored personnel carriers would be committed.21

The plans envisioned splitting West Berlin into two sectors. The sector boundary ran from Konradshöhe in the northwest along the Autobahn ring road from Charlottenburg to Schöneberg, ending at Lichterrade in the south. The area to the west of the divide was designated as Sector I, while that to the east was Sector II. These sectors did not correspond to, and should not be confused with, the British, French, and American occupation sectors.

The occupation of Sector I was to be the task of the NVA’s 1st Motorized Rifle Division (minus its 1st Regiment), the 5th Regiment of Frontier Command North, the 34th and 44th Regiments of Frontier Command Central,22 an assault engineer battalion of the 2d Engineer Brigade, and four battalions of Potsdam’s paramilitary “Combat Groups of the Working Class.”23 The 3d Regiment of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division, flanked by the 5th Frontier Troop Regiment to its left, was to push from the west along Bundesstraße 5 toward Spandau, where the majority of the British Brigade’s facilities were located. The 34th Frontier Troop Regiment would move out of Kladow in the west toward the British military airport at Gatow. In the southwest, the 44th Frontier Regiment was to roll along Bundesstraße 1, penetrating the American sector at Zehlendorf, while the 1st Armored Regiment thrust directly toward the city center. The 2d Regiment of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division was to move out of Teltow in the south toward Steglitz, thereby completing the occupation of Sector I.

Sector II, the eastern portion of West Berlin, would be occupied as follows: The Soviet 6th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, part of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany, would roll past the Brandenburger Gate, proceed down the Avenue of the 17th of June to Ernst Reuter Plaza, and continue down Bismarck Street until it reached the Kaiserdamm Bridge.24 The 18th People’s Police Alert Unit and the 33d Frontier Troop Regiment were to provide flank protection. The 1st Regiment of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division would assault out of Pankow toward Tegel International airport, while the 38th and 40th Frontier Troop Regiments occupied Reinickendorf, part of the French sector. The 35th, 39th, and 42d Frontier Troop Regiments would close in on Neukölln and Kreuzberg, areas within the American sector. Support for these assaults would be provided by the 40th Artillery Brigade, an assault engineer battalion of the 2d Engineer Brigade, and propaganda detachments.

The two major assault thrusts, one from the east and one from the west, were to meet at the Kaiserdamm Bridge near Radio Free Berlin, thereby cutting the city in two. Tegel airport, in the French sector, was to be captured by two airborne companies while Tempelhof Airport in the American sector was to be captured by another. The 1st Battalion of the 40th Air Assault Regiment and parts of 34th Helicopter Transport Squadron would provide the necessary forces. Reserve forces included the 40th Security Battalion, the 19th People’s Police Alert Unit, and four battalions of the (East) Berlin “Combat Groups of the Working Class.” The 40th Signal Battalion was tasked with providing reserve assets for all communication requirements.

Any military worth its salt has prepared contingency plans for operations following the outbreak of war. The Soviet Union and its satellites always claimed that both the structure and planning of the Warsaw Pact revolved around a commitment to defeat the enemy on its own territory following enemy aggression. The initial scenario in the Border’s Edge exercises postulated aggression by NATO, provoking a countermeasure by the Warsaw Pact. Former NVA officers stand by the essentially defensive nature of Pact offensive plans. Yet oddly, little attention is paid to containing and defeating NATO offenses. In fact, East German intelligence evaluations concluded that NATO forces in West Germany lacked the structure and equipment for deep offensive operations in the eastern direction.25 In short, taken at face value, the NVA laid meticulous plans for execution of an operation for which the officially proclaimed premise, aggression by NATO, was evaluated as unlikely at best.

Ministry of State Security’s Role

A clear picture can be reconstructed of how the NVA intended to subdue Berlin. The procedures to be carried out following occupation of the city are of equal interest and can be found in the files of the former East German
Ministry of State Security, or “Stasi.” These files show that the Ministry had prepared a comprehensive blueprint for the communist takeover of power in West Berlin.

A report by the XVth (Intelligence) Department of the [East] Berlin District Area of the ministry (dated 5 May 1978) listed 170 West Berlin facilities that were to be occupied by the Stasi during or immediately after the conquest of the city. The list was detailed and specific, as the following summation for the American sector indicates.

In Zehlendorf, the following American facilities were to be occupied as soon as possible: the U.S. Brigade’s Headquarters and Staff Buildings at Clayallee, the Turner Barracks (Armored elements of U.S. Brigade) and the ammo dumps at Holzungsweg, Hüttenweg, Grunewald Jagen 73, Stahnsdorfer Damm and Potsdamer Chaussee. In Steglitz, the McNair, Andrews, and Roosevelt Barracks were to be occupied, as well as the ammo and fuel dump at Goerzallee, the fuel dump at Dahlemer Weg, and the freight railroad station at Lichterfelde West.

Planning for the occupation of West Berlin continued into the period of détente, indeed becoming more elaborate and detailed. A two-page report signed by the District Leader of the Berlin Area of the Ministry of State Security, Lieutenant-General Wolfgang Schwanitz, on 5 August 1985 elaborates exactly how the Stasi would deal with the challenges of occupation.

Schwanitz ordered that after commencement of operations all “significant enemy centers” would be occupied. These specifically included intelligence and counterintelligence facilities, police stations, archives, and staff/planning centers such as “state offices, research centers (academies and universities), company headquarters, party offices, organization centers, headquarters of anti-communist organizations, and data banks.” It is of inter-

![Assault on Berlin Map](image-url)
est that the various facilities of the Allied Brigades in Berlin were not on this list — they presumably would be occupied by the Soviets, the NVA, or the Frontier Troops rather than by the Ministry for State Security.

From the very first, the Stasi’s most important assignment was to be the arrest and detention of “enemy persons.” A former Stasi lieutenant, Werner Stiller, has indicated that the Ministry of State Security had compiled “extensive files on West German citizens, which would have been of special interest during selection procedures.” The Schwantz Report suggests that detainees would include members of the intelligence communities, leaders of anti-communist organizations, senior police officials, leading politicians, senior civil servants, and persons suspected of having knowledge of business, scientific, or technical secrets. Journalists known to have anti-leftist leanings would also be arrested. Detainees were to be brought to internment camps for immediate questioning. The information gained from these hearings would be used to build up an “effective locating program” aimed at “rendering enemy persons who had gone underground ineffective.”

Offices of the Ministry for State Security were to ensure the continued operation of all vital services and the most important production facilities. Special attention was to be directed to securing all supply warehouses and reserve depots, essential service facilities (electricity, gas, and water), the postal, communication, and transportation systems, and radio and television stations. Important centers of production, especially those “sabotage-sensitive,” were to receive attention. Banks, stock and security centers of deposit, technical and scientific record collections, business account repositories, the federal printing office, museums, galleries, and libraries were all to be secured against theft, destruction, plunder and fraud.

All weapons, ammunition, and explosives which had escaped confiscation by the military were to be seized by the Ministry of State Security. Handguns, hunting rifles and shotguns, industrial explosives and poisons were all to be turned over to the Stasi.

The Leadership Group, headed by a colonel, would exercise control over the Stasi organization in West Berlin. This organization would consist of the colonel and his staff, five operational groups, three working groups, a cryptography/postal/courier group, and guard/security forces. The operational groups corresponded to the “field” departments within the Ministry for State Security. These were Field II (Counterespionage), VII (Protection of the Organs of the Ministry of the Interior), XVIII (Protection of the Economy), XIX (Protection of the Transportation System), and XX (Defense against “political-ideological diversions” and “underground political activities”).

Sixty-five of the 80 billets within the “Leadership Group” were already filled when Schwantz authorized the report in August 1985. The manpower plan listed billet, rank, first and last name, and personal identification number.

The 12 borough offices (one for each West Berlin borough) would each be manned with between 42 and 47 personnel. A lieutenant colonel would head the office in larger boroughs such as Reinickendorf and Neukölln, while in smaller boroughs a major would be designated as the commanding officer. In addition to the commander and deputy commander, each office had an expert for Information and Analysis, the Armed Forces, Economic Affairs, and Internal Security. Each borough office also had communication and cryptography specialists, as well as a watch and security detachment. The expert for Armed Forces probably would have served as a liaison between the Soviet and East German forces. Plans for manning the borough offices were not as developed as those for the “Leadership Group” — only six billets within each borough office were already filled.

It should be noted that the names entered beside the various billets in the manpower plans were not fictitious names entered for training purposes, but were the names of actual Ministry for State Security personnel. The officer who would have been appointed in charge of the Charlottenburg (West Berlin) borough office of the Ministry for State Security, a certain Major Zeiseweis, had been the head of the Stasi’s Treptow (East Berlin) borough office in 1985 before his promotion to lieutenant-colonel and designation as deputy to the Stasi’s District Leader for the Berlin Area in 1986. He recently participated in a broadcast focusing on topics related to the former German Democratic Republic (Ostdeutsche Rundfunks Brandenburg, 31 January and 15 February 1994), but made no mention about his planned function following an East German occupation of West Berlin. His superior, Lieutenant General Schwantz, was more candid during a speech before the study group “Zwiesgespräch” (Dialogue) on 20 May 1992, when he passingly noted that among the tasks of the Berlin District Area office of the Ministry for State

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Security were “measures supporting the occupation of West Berlin in the event of an aggression directed against the German Democratic Republic.”

Conclusion

The detailed and specific plans of the NVA and the Ministry for State Security for the occupation of West Berlin were never executed. Does this bear out claims that these plans were merely defensive contingencies, similar in nature to the operational plans laid by NATO during the same time period? At least in the case of the Berlin operation, one thing stands clear: all records and statements indicate that no serious offensive on the part of the French, British, and American brigades in Berlin was anticipated. Instead, NVA and Soviet units anticipated cutting the city in two in one day and completing occupation by the end of the third day. It is highly questionable to claim now that such planning contributed to the peace and stability of Berlin and Europe.

East German plans concerning the occupation of West Berlin must be evaluated in context with higher-level Warsaw Pact plans pertaining to the Federal Republic of Germany and Western Europe in general. The operational plans remain tightly classified secrets of the Russian Defense Ministry, yet reports of various exercises give an indication of what was envisioned. On July 1, 1983, East German Minister of Defense Hoffmann made a report to the National Defense Council of the German Democratic Republic regarding the upper-level Warsaw Pact staff exercise “SOJUS-83.” The task assigned to the players representing the Unified Forces of the Warsaw Pact was the conquest of the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France within a period of 35 to 40 days from start of operations.

NATO and West German officials were unwilling to make any comments about their knowledge and evaluation of Warsaw Pact operational plans. Western intelligence reports regarding the various Border’s Edge (Bordkante) exercises remain inaccessible. The extent to which East German operational plans were known to the West, as well as the defensive planning of Allied and West Berlin forces, remains currently classified.

The East German leadership believed that the occupation of West Berlin was a serious possibility well into the 1980s, as is made apparent by the enormous material and human resources that were devoted to the planning of such occupation. Every conceivable preparation was made. Three examples illustrate this. On the 23d of June 1980, the National Defense Council ordered that 4.9 billion DM of GDR currency (emission 1955) be stored as “military money” to be used as “a secondary currency valid in the territory of the enemy and equivalent its currency.” On the 25th of January 1985, the National Defense Council ordered that a new medal for bravery in war be designed (the Blücher Medal for Bravery), of which 8,000 were to be minted immediately. Last, new regulations for “warfront reporting” were issued on 5 December 1986. Until the very last session of the National Defense Council on the 16th of June 1989, all East German ministers, as well as the chairmen of the 15 “District Defense Boards,” had to submit reports attesting to the war readiness of their ministries or districts. Party Chairman and Head of State Erich Honecker continually reminded both military and civilian organizations to maintain a “wartime state-of-mind.”

The final decision to launch an invasion of West Berlin never lay in the hands of East Germany, but always depended on Soviet approval and support. The party chairmen and leaders of the Soviet Union, who controlled the Warsaw Pact and who would have had to issue the necessary orders for an assault, were not reckless gamblers. “Stalin and all his successors would have preferred to achieve their aims — the supposedly inevitable spread of Socialism to the rest of the globe, according to Marxist-Leninist teaching — by political/economic means alone.” Their alternate plan, a military solution to the East-West global competition, consumed immense amounts of treasure, talent, and attention, but was never executed. The precondition of a successful offensive war, a decisive edge in the military balance, could never be attained. The catastrophic conditions of the communist economies, coupled with an escalation in the cost and technological level of the arms race, caused the Soviet leadership to finally cast aside an offensive conception of warfare in 1987.

Notes

1Statement by a former NVA colonel at the first Commander Meeting of the new Bundeswehr East Command, 10 October 1990. The Bundeswehr East Command was the compromise solution reached regarding German unification and the military question in Germany: the Bundeswehr was to assume response for the defense of East German territory but the facilities and personnel in the new territories were to remain outside the NATO structure. See Otto Wenzel’s “So sollte in West-Berlin einmarschiert werden,” Berliner Morgenpost. 18 April 1993.


3The operational plans of the Warsaw Pact were destroyed or turned over to the Soviets during the period prior to German unification.
yet the other records of the NVA, including exercise and training records, became property of the West German government. Many of the NVA’s records are now open to public scrutiny at the Militärarchiv-Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Potsdam (formerly the Militärarchiv der DDR). Footnote 25 discusses the files of the Ministry for State Security, which became the property of the West German government. The latest exercise and training records, became property of the West German government. Many of the records of the NVA, including exercise and training records, became property of the West German government. Most of the remaining records of the NVA are in the possession of the German Intelligence Service of the Federal Republic of Germany (Gestapo). Copies of these files are in the possession of the Regierender Bürgermeister of West Berlin.

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2Federal Archive - Military Archive, Potsdam Section (hereafter cited as BA-MAP), VA-10-20750, VA-10-22942, VA-10-22939 and VA-10-23894.


4The names of these institutions and organizations apply specifically to West Berlin institutions and are not used in other German cities: for example, only in West Berlin is the Municipal Assembly termed the Abgeordnetenhaus and the Mayoralty the Regierender Bürgermeister. The map and exercise plans are found in BA-MAP, VA-10-22942, Map Nr. 282.

5BA-MAP, VA-10-22942, p. 297.

6Ibid., pp. 15, 39.

7Ibid., pp. 17, 20, 45.

8Ibid., pp. 68, 89, 91.

9Ibid., p. 305.

10Ibid., pp. 19, 85, 91, 272, 309.

11Ibid., pp. 307, 310, 311.

12Ibid., pp. 56, 123.

13Ibid., p. 58.

14BA-MAP, VA-10-25911, pp. 1, 14-


16Göpel, pp. 289-95.

17Göpel, pp. 287, 293.

18An alternate headquarters would be situated in a bunker in the area of Blankenfelde to the south of Berlin.


20A Frontier Command of the East German Frontier Troops was comparable to a division; it was commanded by a major-general.

21The mechanized battalions of the “Fighting Groups of the Working Class” were equipped with armored personnel carriers, artillery, antiaircraft, and antitank weapons (Fiftieth Meeting of the National Defense Council of the GDR, 18 November 1976. See Microfilm BA-MAP, VA-01/39495, p. 271).

22Walter Jablonsky, “Die NVA im Staat der SED,” Die NVA. Ed. Klaus Naumann, p. 56. In short, while publicly maintaining that NATO was preparing for a war of aggression against the nations of the Warsaw Pact, the East German Politburo understood that NATO’s plans of forward defense and engagement of the “follow-on-forces” were not equivalent to offensive war planning.

23These files are currently being evaluated by the West German “Federal Commission for the Files of the Ministry of Security of the former German Democratic Republic” usually simply referred to as the “Gauck Commission” after the name of its chairman. Copies of these files are in the possession of Dr. Wenzel.

24Between 1986 and 1989, Schwantitz was one of four deputies for the Minister of State Security, General Erich Mielke, a member of the Politburo of the SED. The last communist head of government of the GDR, Hans Modrow, appointed Schwantitz Director of the Office of National Security, a cabinet-level position.

25Stiller was a lieutenant in the Ministry of State Security who defected to the West in 1979. As a protective measure, he was provided with an alternate identity and resided in the United States for ten years. Werner Stiller, Im Zentrum der Spionage, 5th ed. (Mainz: Hause, 1986), p. 158.

26The National Defense Council of the former German Democratic Republic was headed by Chairman of the SED party and Head of State Erich Honecker and at that time consisted of 10 members of the Politburo of East Germany. See records of the 67th session of the National Defense Council, BA-MAP, VA-01/39528, p. 77.

2731st session of the National Defense Council, BA-MAP, VA-01/39522, p. 69-


2937th session of the National Defense Council, BA-MAP, VA-01/39534, p. 4.

30The German term, “Bezirks einsatzleitungen,” has no English equivalent. A Bezirks einsatzleitungen consisted of the district party chairman, the commander of the military district, the leader of the district Ministry for State Security office, commander of the district People’s Police organization, the district council chairman, and the leader of the SED party’s security division.

3156th session of the National Defense Council on 17 September 1982, BA-MAP, VA 01/39527, p. 70.