From: Howard Seguine, SUMMARY SYMPOSIUM ON THE 50th ANNIVERSARY OF THE TRINITY TEST Sponsored by National Academy of Sciences (NAS) & DOE; held at NAS, Sunday, 16 July 1995 Hazel O'Leary (opening remarks) said the cleanup of DOE weapon facilities is now estimated to be about $250 billion, spread over five years, and not the $1 trillion that was reported earlier. Edward Teller disagreed that it would be that much. He said our thinking is wrong in viewing the high- and low-level radioactive material as "waste." Instead, we should think of it as a byproduct, e.g., use it for sterilizing food (extend its shelf life). He repeated this theme several times during the day, apparently for Ms. O'Leary's benefit since she remained at the symposium all day. SENATOR JEFF BINGAMAN (D-NM) Was highly critical of Congress's methods of operation KEYNOTE ADDRESS - Dr. Jack Gibbons, Science Advisor to the President The major thrust of my office (OSTP) is looking for more efficient use of energy But major nuclear weapons accomplishments have occurred in past 15 months: All FSRs agreed to the recent indefinite extension of the NPT Dismantlement of nuclear weapons is moving ahead with no undue problems START II is moving toward ratification Yeltsin & Clinton agreed on the need for a START III (further reductions) We're close to clarifying ABM and strategic treaties Comprehensive test ban is our definite goal One year ago, the US spent $1 million in Russia to enhance safety and security. In the past year that figure grew to $10 million, and we fully expect to increase that to $100 million in the next 15 months "Hazel O'Leary, we're really proud of how you negotiated some tough issues with the Russians several weeks ago" The Comprehensive National Technology & Science Strategy (CNTSS) is now in draft form and is expected to be on the President's desk by the end of this month. It will include national security issues. Alas, some members of the media, Congress, and the public fail to understand its implications, so it may experience some tough sledding PANELS: Marvin Kalb was the moderator for both panels. PANEL 1 - A RETROSPECTIVE: HOW TRINITY SHAPED SCIENCE AND SECURITY Panelists: Dr. Harold Agnew1 Dr. Dave Holloway2 Dr. Phillip Morrison3 Mr. Richard Rhodes4 Dr. Edward Teller5Kalb's question to panelists: What new insights do you have on the TRINITY test and nuclear weapons in general? Agnew: One of the larger problems confronting us is the myth that plutonium from spent reactor fuel cannot be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons Teller: The bomb surprisingly was a wonderful thing in that it proved to be a world stabilizer … no wars among major powers in the past 50 years Rhodes: Curtis LeMay had already bombed 60 major Japanese cities, with the resulting deaths of over one million Japanese. Therefore, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were merely "business as usual" for him except that fewer aircraft and less time was needed Kalb's question to panelists: Should there have been a demonstration, and was dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki a mistake? Agnew: Absolutely not. If the demo [of an implosion bomb] had been a dud it could have given the enemy a new resolve. We had only enough oralloy for the Hiroshima bomb Morrison: Can't say either way. Don't have all the information that Truman, Stimson, Marshall, et al had available to them Teller: No! I was asked to sign the "Chicago" petition asking the President to stage a demonstration rather than using the bomb on an enemy; however, the drafters couldn't answer my questions, so I didn't sign Rhodes: LeMay thought the bomb was superfluous. Rhodes noted that the 509th Composite Bombardment Group (of which the Enola Gay and Boch's Car were a part) had early plans to drop a bomb in either Europe or Japan Holloway: Truman wasn't given all the then-current data and opinions. Instead, the momentum of the Manhattan Project caused him to authorize use of the bombs. Also, the death of Roosevelt essentially ensured that the bomb would be used Robert Serber, a prominent member of the Project was in the audience, which included about 30 alumni of the TRINITY test. He said, "We, at TRINITY and Tinian, were convinced that dropping the bomb would stop the war ASAP, with the lives of untold numbers of people on both sides saved. After Hiroshima, we were real heroes. Military personnel and their families continually thanked us for stopping the war and letting them get back to a normal life Kalb's question: Any regrets for having been a key part of the Manhattan Project? Teller: None Morrison: Yes Agnew: None Kalb's question: On a wall at the Hiroshima Peace Park is an inscription, "Please sleep in peace, for this era will never be repeated." Do you think this is an accurate statement? Holloway: Yes Teller: Yes, at least for the use of nuclear weapons in a major war. I believed the same as Truman when, in 1946, I heard him tell an audience of about 2,000, "If we don't build atomic bombs, freedom surely will be lost" Morrison: Who knows? Rhodes: Yes Audience question: Any insights into the German effort to build a nuclear weapon? Teller: I'm firmly convinced Heisenberg sabotaged the German effort. He was my teacher and I knew how thorough he was. He and I made the same theoretical mistake in nuclear physics (an equation of state). I found my mistake in a week or two. I know Heisenberg would have looked for the obvious mistake, but he never told Speer & the General Staff he had erred. Also, he was taped, by the Brits at the Farm Hall debriefing following VE Day, less than two hours after learning of the Hiroshima bomb, correctly telling his fellow German nuclear scientists how the bomb was designed and what the physics were PANEL 2 - THE 21ST CENTURY: SCIENTIFIC & SECURITY CHALLENGES Panelists: Mr. Al Alm Dr. Sidney Drell Dr. Siegfried Hecker Ambassador Paul Nitze Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky Kalb's question to panelists: Opening comments? Panofsky: It is extremely unlikely that any of the five declared nuclear states will use a nuclear weapon; however, there's also the risk of a rogue launch. The real problem is proliferant nations. Our problem now is to determine the mission of US nuclear weapons, e.g., deterrence (of what & against whom?). Biological & chemical weapons are bigger threats to the US (and world) than nuclear because of their ease of manufacture and "reasonable" costs. 7-8,000 nuclear weapons (total for US & FSR) is entirely too much; we need more reductions Drell: NPT extension is so vitally important. Proliferants pose the greatest threat to world stability, but we must do CTB and START III Treaties. We have room for optimism now Nitze: Must develop conventional strategic deterrents so nuclear weapons can be done away with Alm: Mankind now has the largest environmental cleanup problem facing it: DOE weapon facilities (Alm said nothing about Chernobyl). We have (1) 100 million gallons of high-level waste at Hanford, and it's leaking, (2) 26 million metric tons of plutonium from dismantled weapons, and two Pentagon-volumes of low- level waste. We're not working fast enough to protect the American public, but this is Congress's fault, not DOE's. We probably will need about $40 billion over 20 years to resolve the Hanford problem (return it to pre- Manhattan Project condition) Hecker: Manhattan Project was the first time basic science & engineering were consolidated for a national goal. Should strive to continue this approach for the betterment of mankind & the earth. We must stay strong & keep the resolve for real deterrence. The nation & world can afford to have fewer nuclear weapons, but not to be less smart. Underlining Agnew's morning comment [myth that plutonium recovered from spent reactor fuel cannot be used to build nuclear weapons], the US-FSR have about 200 metric tons of such material in our reactors today, and the world has about 1,000 tons total Drell: We must reread Vannevar Bush's Science: the Endless Frontier, which has a blueprint for nuclear control that is more applicable today than it was when the Baruch Plan was popular in the White House Kalb's question: I'm distressed that some in the media, Congress, and the public are saying that science is a luxury or is not doing its job. How does this relate to proliferants? Panofsky: Proliferants look at nuclear weapons as the great equalizer. The French are testing, but we don't know how they view the mission of their weapons Nitze: Why are the French testing? Answer: they believe there's money in it for them in that they can sell small nuclear weapons to most bidders with money! NOTE: This comment caused much murmuring and gasps from the audience Hecker: The US is putting more and more into control of FSR fissile material. Panofsky said this will cost several billions of dollars if it's to be successful, but we can't wait Kalb's question to Drell: What are you listening for when you talk to Congress and you're told, "But all parts of the government are being cut back?" Drell's answer: Long-range vision, and it's sorely lacking in both political parties. Don't forget that when the nation told the Manhattan Project scientists, "Give us a bomb," it wasn't science; it was an application of science already done (they built on the work of Becquerel, Fermi, Strassmann, et al). The audience wholeheartedly agreed that vision is lacking Kalb's question: Should we be optimistic on global proliferation? Hecker: Yes. Look at the precedents we've already seen: Union of So. Africa, Brazil, & Argentina agreed to dismantle their nuclear weapons programs. The real problem is those nations backing terrorism and the terrorist groups themselves Panofsky: Agreed. Reason: we have fewer nuclear nations (declared and nondeclared than we would have conjectured 50 years ago Kalb's question: How difficult is it to build a weapon today (by a dedicated group, not a nation)? Panofsky: Sure, it can be done Nitze: This comes down to politics. I suggested we talk to North Korea about its program, but some said it was too risky to talk (because we might not know how to handle the response). "Talking to" included threats as applicable, Nitze said, so long as there was a reasonable perception of US resolve. I advocate developing and divulging a US policy to the effect that if any proliferant nation uses or provides a nuclear weapon, the US will take than nation down by whatever means it sees fit Kalb's question: Should we exert stricter controls over plutonium separation, from spent fuel, by our allies, relative to reactor fuel we provided to them? Drell: Not particularly concerned because of the dollars (ours) involved Hecker: We don't have the answers on how to dispose of the fuel. What we need is a long-range plan for determining this Panofsky: You all [panelists & audience] seem to have forgotten that it's US policy not to separate plutonium from civilian power reactors. The best we could hope for would be to try to dissuade others from doing so. Failing that, we should pressure our allies to place all materials under IAEA control Kalb's question: Do we need testing of any kind to maintain the enduring stockpile? Hecker: We're prepared to do without Kalb's question: Does ballistic missile defense add to the proliferation problem, or is it contrary to the real goals of the nonproliferation program? Panofsky: Hard to say, but we can't ignore the implications Kalb's question: Where should our emphasis be for the next 50 years? Drell: (1) Support basic sciences in the national labs & universities, (2) apply science to the environmental restoration problem, (3) commit to maintaining a good science base for safe nuclear weapons (stockpile stewardship), & (4) do whatever necessary to keep terrorists from getting nuclear weapons Alm: (1) Don't lose the basic science base, (2) apply our national-level R&D expertise to environmental restoration, and (3) realistic identify options for alternative energy sources Hecker: (1) Apply science to DOE missions, (2) develop new multidiscipline sciences to DOE missions, & (3) develop alternative energy options that don't pollute and contaminate Nitze: Don't lose our basic science foundation. We've invested too much and derived too many benefits in it to now let it atrophy Panofsky: (1) Unlink items of a "clear and present danger" from those of a long-range nature, e.g., control of fissile materials is far more important, in the short term, than environment restoration, (2) understand sciences & technologies involved in restoration, & (3) understand energy production pros & cons (fossil fuel vs. nuclear vs. other) … we don't have much more than emotion & partial data now 1Participant in TRINITY test and aboard aircraft at Hiroshima. Director, LANL, 1970-792Professor of Political Science, and Co-Director, International Security & Arms Control, Stanford. Author of History of the German Atomic Bomb, and Stalin and the Bomb3Participant in TRINITY test4Author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb, and the just released Dark Sun: The Making the Thermonuclear Weapon 5Participant in TRINITY test. Throughout the day, Teller frequently lauded Oppenheimer's leadership and insights; interesting vis-à-vis the role he played in the ouster of Oppenheimer from the AEC test. Throughout the day, Teller frequently lauded Oppenheimer's leadership and insights; interesting vis-à-vis the role he played in the ouster of Oppenheimer from the AEC